Preventive Defense is a concept for American defense strategy in the post-Cold War era, premised on the belief that the absence of an imminent, major, traditional military threat to American security presents today's leaders with an unaccustomed challenge and opportunity to prevent future Cold War-scale threats to international security from emerging. While the U.S. defense establishment must continue to deter major regional conflicts and provide peacekeeping and humanitarian relief missions when necessary, its highest priority is to contribute to forestalling developments that could directly threaten the survival and vital interests of American citizens. To this end, the Project focuses on forging productive security partnerships with Russia and its neighbors, engaging an emerging China, addressing the lethal legacy of Cold War weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and countering WMD proliferation and potential acts of catastrophic terrorism. In doing so, PDP seeks to devise creative, new policy approaches that reflect a preventive defense posture and, through intense personal interaction with political and military leaders around the world, nourish a highly informed but non-governmental "track-two" dialogue that explores opportunities for international agreement and cooperation. In addition, PDP has undertaken an intense review of the U.S. government's structures and practices for carrying out foreign and security policies, which have not changed in half a century.
Preface and Acknowledgments
n its three years of existence, the Preventive Defense Project, a research collaboration of Stanford University and the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University, co-directed by William J. Perry and Ashton B. Carter, has worked to devise and promote policies to advance U.S. national security and international security. The Project's efforts have extended from Russia to China, and from counterproliferation to counter-terrorism. In all our work, we have sought to prescribe specific policies and actions the U.S. government can adopt to prevent new security threats from emerging in the post-Cold War world.
Like most other policy thinkers, we have tended to assume that once Washington got the policy right, implementation of those policies would follow smoothly. This assumption, however, has increasingly seemed to us unwarranted. While the U.S. military capability for joint operations is unquestionably the best in the world, the "back room" of the Department of Defense (DOD) -contracting, personnel policies, and managerial practices -is not up to the standards found elsewhere in our society, nor is it up to the level that the taxpayers have a right to expect of their government. While the United States has defined the key defense missions of the post-Cold War world, the structure and practices of DOD have adapted only incompletely to the job of accomplishing them. In the short run, the potential benefits of wise strategy and policy will not be fully realized, but it is in the long run that shortcomings in management and organization will really come to haunt us, diminishing our presently unmatched military capability.
With this book, the Preventive Defense Project seeks to prescribe remedies for some of the organizational and managerial deficiencies of the national security establishment. Our focus is largely on DOD and the interagency process of policy and program coordination. We believe these problems and proposed solutions warrant high-priority attention from the next U.S. presidential administration and Congress. Both executive and legislative branches will have new beginnings in January 2001, and there is no better time to tackle problems of the underlying functioning of the government. Man-I x | preface and acknowledgments agement and organization problems are not the juiciest of issues for campaigns and high politics, to be sure. However, when newly elected and appointed officials take office, they will find that their ability to translate their policies into results will depend crucially on making the kinds of adaptations described in this volume.
Not all of these issues are new: problems of defense management, particularly reform of DOD's cumbersome acquisition system, were of deep concern to the late David Packard, Deputy Secretary of Defense and co-founder of the Hewlett-Packard Company. As deputy secretary and later as Chairman of President Reagan's Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense Management -which became known as the Packard Commission -David Packard pioneered many of the themes that animate this book. Preventive Defense Project co-director William J. Perry served on the Packard Commission; as Secretary of Defense two decades later he promoted Packard's vision of quality management in government. Our work here is in many ways an attempt to fulfill this vision. We were therefore particularly gratified to receive early support for the preparation of this book from the David and Lucile Packard Foundation; we thank President Richard T. Schlosberg III and Cole Wilbur of the Foundation for giving us this opportunity. In token of our respect and gratitude, we have dedicated this book to the memory of David Packard.
The Project also received critical and generous support from The Simons Foundation, the Herbert S. Winokur, Jr. Public Policy Fund, and the MITRE Corporation. The Preventive Defense Project as a whole was launched and has been nurtured by the Carnegie Corporation of New York and The John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation. The founders and staff of these supporting organizations not only provided resources vital to the completion of this book, but were collaborators in conceiving and shaping the ideas that appear in these pages. The Project also received key inputs and inspiration from David Baxt, Vance Coffman, Stephen Hadley, John Hamre, and Philip A. Odeen.
It is in the long run -on the watch of the next generation of defense policy leaders -that uncorrected management problems will really make themselves felt if steps to solve them are not taken now. For this reason, we acknowledge our responsibility and our privilege in teaching and collaborating with some of these future leaders at Harvard and Stanford. It seemed appropriate that these students and
